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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
STATUTORY SHORT FORMS OF DEEDS AND MORTGAGEs.-At the
1945 session of the New York State Legislature, Sections 254 and
258 of the New York Real Property Law were amended changing
certain clauses in the statutory short forms for mortgages and mort-
gage bonds, and the construction thereof, in accordance with recom-
mendations made by the Law Revision Commission. The purpose
of the amendments is (1) to make the language in the statutory short
form mortgage state accurately the effects of the covenants as they
are required to be construed by Section 254 of the Real Property
Law, and (2) to make the grace period applicable to defaults in the
payment of interest also applicable to defaults in the payment of
principal in conformity with the language of the statutory covenants.'
The amendments are to go into effect on July 1, 1946.
At common law a mortgagor's failure to meet the installments
of principal or payments of interest, taxes, assessments or insurance
premiums did not cause the whole principal to mature at once. Such
acceleration of maturity was effected either by statute or by cove-
nants incorporated in the mortgage or mortgage bonds 2 and the de-
fault did not become operative to accelerate the date fixed for the
payment of the principal debt in the absence of a specific stipulation
of the parties to that effect in the mortgage.8 Such covenants have
quite generally been held valid and in many jurisdictions have been
included in the statutory forms of bonds and mortgages either ex-
pressly or by reference.
4
The New York Legislature authorized the use of short form
bonds and mortgages containing acceleration clauses as early as 1890
and provided for statutory construction of such clauses.5 At the
present time Schedules M and N of Section 258 set forth the optional
short forms for real property mortgages and the accompanying
bonds, and Section 254 sets forth the construction which must be
given to the several clauses in these short forms. Since in some re-
spects the construction stated in Section 254 "enlarges or contradicts
the express provisions set forth in Schedules M and N to such an
extent that the forms may be a trap for the unwary," 6 the Law Re-
Although it has been suggested that these drugs be made subject to federal
narcotic control laws, authorities are fearful lest such action would result in
a breakdown of the effectiveness of the control over narcotics such as opium
and morphine which, it is felt, demand more stringent control than the milder
barbiturates.
1 N. Y. LEGIS. Doc. (1945) No. 65 (H) 11 n.
2 N. Y. LEGIs. Doc. (1945) No. 65 (H) 27
3 Pennsylvania Co. for Insurances v. Broadway-Stevens Co., 105 N. J. Eq.
494, 148 Atl. 575 (1930); Terrell v. Cheatham, 200 Ky. 667, 255 S. W. 262
(1923).
4 See the Table of State Laws in Handbook of the National Conference
of Commissions on Uniform State Laws (1921) 256.
5 N. Y. Laws 1890, c. 475.
6 N. Y. LEcis. Doc. (1945) No. 65 (H) 13.
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vision Commission made a comprehensive study of the discrepancies
in these statutes and made recommendations which resulted in the
passage of the Act herein discussed.
I. Acceleration at the Option of the Mortgagee
Schedules M and N of Section 258 contain the following accel-
eration clause:
4. That the whole of said principal sum shall become due after default in the
payment of any installment of principal or of interest for . .. days, or after
default in the payment of any tax, water rate or assessment for ... days
after notice and demand.
Literally interpreted this clause would seem to provide for an auto-
matic maturity of the principal sum in the event of a default in any
of the payments specified in clause "4", and also to provide for a
grace period with regard to the payments both of interest and of an
installment of principal.
However, Section 254, subdivision 2, construes this covenant
to mean that should a default occur in the payment of an installment
of principal, or of interest for . . . days, or of any tax, water rate
or assessment for . . . days, the whole principal sum with all arrear-
age of interest thereon, shall, at the option of the mortgagee or
obligee become and be due and payable immediately, thus making
the maturity of the principal sum elective at the will of the mort-
gagee or obligee, rather than automatic, and also making a vital dis-
tinction between the effect of a default in the payment of an install-
ment of principal and a default in the payment of interest.
In Albertina Realty Company v. Rosbra Realty Corporation,7
the Court of Appeals, in a foreclosure action based on a default in
the payment of principal, held that the effect of the acceleration clause
set forth in the statutory form of mortgage provided by Schedule M
of Section 258, as construed by Section 254, was to make the default
in the payment of an installment of principal on the due date a ground
for accelerating the due date of the entire principal of the mortgage,
at the election of the holder thereof, without regard to the days of
grace allowed in case of default in the payment of interest. The court
further held that "it is unnecessary to decide just what a holder of
a mortgage must do to exercise the right of election under an ac-
celeration clause; . . . the unequivocal overt act of the plaintiff in
filing the summons and verified complaint and hs pendens constitutes
a valid election."
7 Albertina Realty Co. v. Rosbro Realty Corp., 258 N. Y. 472, 180 N. E.
176 (1932).
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It is interesting to note that the acceleration clause of Schedule C
of the original Act (Chapter 475 of the Laws of 1890) reads as
follows:
Third. And it is expressly agreed that the whole of said principal sum shall
become due at the option of the said party of the second part after default
in ....
and that this phrase "at the option of" continued to be a part of the
statute in the amendments of 1896 and 1897.8 Chapter 681 of the
Laws of 1917 amended the statute again and the phrase was at that
time omitted from the acceleration clause, although a corresponding
amendment was not made in the statutory construction of the clause
in Section 254 which continued to use the phrase. The Act of the
1945 Legislature restores the phrase "at the option of" the mortgagee
to covenant "4" of Section 258 and thus makes it conform with the
construction given in Section 254; and it also makes the covenant
conform with the language used in similar forms in the Uniform Real
Estate Mortgage Act.
II. Application of Grace Period to Defaults
Much confusion has also grown up regarding the application of
the grace period to a default in the payment of an installment of
principal as well as to a default in interest payments. Covenant "4'
of Schedules M and N now provides that the whole of the principal
sum shall become due "after default in the payment of any install-
ment of principal or of interest for . . . days." The language of the
covenant would seem to clearly indicate an intent to have the grace
period apply to the payment of both principal and interest but sub-
division 2 of Section 254, construing the covenant, omits any refer-
ence to a default in the payment of an installment of principal and
makes the grace period applicable only to defaults in the payment of
interest. In the leading case of Albertina Realty Company v. Rosbro
Realty Corporation it was held that the effect of this omission was
to make the default in the payment of the installment of principal
on the due date a ground for accelerating the due date of the entire
principal, at the election of the holder, without regard to the days
of grace allowed in case of a default in the payment of interest. And
in the case of Besa v. Slobodoff 9 the court held that a clause in the
statutory short form mortgage providing that "the whole of the prin-
cipal sum shall become due after default in the payment of any in-
stallment of principal or of interest for thirty days" must be con-
strued, under Section 254, subdivision 2, as limiting the thirty days'
provision to the payment of interest and not to the payment of an
8 N. Y. LE~is. Doc. (1945) No. 65 (H) 29.
9 Besa v. Slobodoff, 129 Misc. 205, 221 N. Y. Supp. 588 (1927).
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installment of principal, and that, accordingly the mortgagee was
within his rights in demanding payment of the whole principal sum
although the mortgagor made a tender of the installment of principal
before the thirty days had expired. The court further said here that
the mortgagor was laboring "under the common erroneous impres-
sion that the provision requiring the lapse of a certain time after a
default before the acceleration of the time of payment of the principal
goes into effect gives a period of grace for payment of an install-
ment of principal. The payment of interest and of installment of
principal becomes due on the date specified in the mortgage and there
is an immediate default if not then paid, and the time is not enlarged
by any provision in respect to the acceleration of the due dates of
the balance. The mortgagee was within his rights in demanding
payment of the whole principal." However, the court relieved the
mortgagor of the consequences of his mistaken belief, upon payment
of the amounts due with interest thereon, because he had acted in
good faith and had tendered payment within a short period after it
was due and the mortgagee had suffered no damage by the delay.
This confusion regarding the allowance of days of grace has been
obviated by the amendment which is to go into effect on July 1,
1946. The language of the statute being made more clear by the
addition of the words "and interest" following the words "principal
sum" and by a change in the punctuation of the clause (placing a
colon after the word "mortgagee" and a semi-colon after "days").
In its amended form subdivision "4" will read:
4. That the whole of said principal sum and interest shall become due at the
option of the mortgagee: after default in the payment of any installment of
principal or of interest for ... days; or after default in the payment of any
tax, water rate or assessment for ... days ....
This amendment brings the New York law into conformity in
this respect with the Uniform Real 'Estate Mortgage Act and with
the New Jersey law.
III. Covenant to Imnure
Schedules M and N of Section 258 contain the following
covenant:
2. That this mortgagor will keep the buildings on the premises insured against
loss by fire for the benefit of the mortgagee.
Section 254, subdivision 4, construes this to mean that the mort-
gagor will keep the buildings insured and assign and deliver the pol-
icy to the mortgagee, and in default of so doing that the mortgagee
may insure the said buildings and pay the premiums therefor; that
the mortgagor must, on demand, reimburse the mortgagee for all
such premiums paid, and that the mortgagee at his option may elect
to accelerate the maturity of the whole principal sum in case of the
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mortgagor's failure to assign and deliver the policies or to reimburse
the mortgagee for any payments made by him for premiums.
It will be noted that nothing in the language of covenant "2" of
Section 258 would inform a mortgagor signing the New York short
form of mortgage that he was agreeing to a statutory acceleration
of maturity of principal in the event that he so failed to reimburse
the mortgagee or failed to assign and deliver the policies to him.
Indeed the covenant does not even mention the fact that if the mort-
gagor fails to insure as agreed that the mortgagee may insure the
buildings and pay the premiums and then look to the mortgagor for
reimbursement.
To overcome the discrepancy at present existing between the
language of this covenant "2" of Section 258 and its statutory con-
struction as given in Section 254(4), the legislature added at the
end of covenant "2" the following:
that he will assign and deliver the policies to the mortgagee; and that he will
reimburse the mortgagee for any premiums paid for insurance made by the
mortgagee on the mortgagor's default in so insuring the buildings or in so
assigning and delivering the policies.
A similar change has been made in the wording of Section 254, sub-
division 4, so as to make it more clearly relate to the language of
Section 258, clause "2".
The covenant in the mortgage providing for acceleration of ma-
turity of the principal sum in the case of certain defaults, i.e., cove-
nant "4" of Section 258, has been enlarged to include also the statu-
tory acceleration as construed by Section 254, subdivision 4, by the
addition of the words:
... or after default after notice and demand either in assigning and de-
livering the policies insuring the buildings against loss by fire or in reim-
bursing the mortgagee for premiums paid on such insurance, as hereinbefore
provided; or after default upon request in furnishing a statement of the
amount due on the bond and mortgage and whether any offsets or defenses
exist against the mortgage debt, as hereinafter provided.
It was desirable that this amendment to the New York Real
Property Law in relation to certain clauses in the statutory short
form mortgages and mortgage bonds and the construction thereof
should be made so that the language of the statute would not be mis-
leading and that the grace period might be made to apply to defaults
in the payment of installments of principal as well as to defaults in
interest payments.
MARY K. BLAIR.
IMPROVEMENT AND UNIFICATION OF PROVISIONS RELATING TO
NOTICES-OF CLAIM AGAINST PUBLIC CORPORATION.-As a matter
of common law a municipal corporation when acting in its govern-
mental or public capacity is not liable for its torts and when acting
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